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The Under-Appreciated Value of Advisory Guidelines
Erica J. Hashimoto*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provided that the trial court "shall
impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range" set forth in the United States
Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") issued by the Sentencing Commission.
With that one phrase, the Act created a system of guidelines that was binding
upon judges, rather than simply advisory. Concerns about excessive disparity and
undue leniency in sentencing unquestionably drove the political coalition that
passed the Act.2 It is not clear, however, why Congress believed that
mandatory-as opposed to advisory-guidelines were necessary to address those
concerns. With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that mandatory guidelines
were unnecessary in 1984. Indeed, more than a year of experience under a regime
of advisory guidelines, put in place by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Booker,3 reveals that advisory guidelines effectively prevent both disparity and
leniency-related problems.4 Unfortunately, just as Congress failed to give
meaningful consideration to the adequacy of advisory guidelines some twenty
years ago, it now seems determined to make the same mistake.
II. MANDATORY GUIDELINES AND THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 had a decade-long, rather tortuous
history.6 Despite that extensive history, however, the provision that made the
Guidelines mandatory, and ultimately rendered them unconstitutional,7 slipped
into the Act almost unnoticed! Not only did that provision cause the Supreme
Court to declare the Guidelines unconstitutional in 2005, but even in 1984, it
almost sounded the death knell of the Sentencing Reform Act in the House of
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I appreciate the helpful comments
of Peter Spiro and Paul Heald and the research assistance of Meghan Marino. All errors are my own.
I. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified prior to
amendment at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West 1995)) (emphasis added).
2. See infra Part H.
3. 543 U.S. 220, 245-46.
4. See infra Part IIl.
5. As this goes to press, Congress is debating a bill that would make the Guidelines more binding upon
judges. See H.R. 1528, 109th Cong. (2005).
6. The legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act has been chronicled in detail. See Marc L. Miller
& Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin' Heart(land): The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723 (1999); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993).
7. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (concluding that United States Sentencing
Guidelines are unconstitutional because of their binding nature).
8. See infra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
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Representatives.9 Because the mandatory nature of the Guidelines now has taken
on such significance, it is important to understand the forces that converged to
pass the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the reasons those forces ultimately
embraced mandatory, rather than advisory, guidelines.
A bipartisan coalition in the Senate produced the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984. '0 Although the two parties united in the belief that action was needed to
curb the sentencing discretion of federal district court judges, their reasons
behind that belief differed somewhat." A group of liberal senators, led initially
by Senator Edward Kennedy, became concerned in the 1970s about a perceived
disparity in sentencing among federal judges. 2 Senator Kennedy's concern
reportedly stemmed from United States District Court Judge Marvin Frankel's
analysis in Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order.3 Criticizing the scheme of
judicial discretion and the "almost wholly unchecked and sweeping" power of
the federal judiciary, Judge Frankel proposed the creation of a commission to
formulate binding guidelines.'4 After reading Judge Frankel's book and meeting
with him, Senator Kennedy reportedly was shocked at the "hopeless
inconsistency" in federal court sentencing and decided to introduce legislation
creating a sentencing commission, as recommended by Judge Frankel, to curb the
discretion exercised by federal judges."
In 1977, Senator Kennedy introduced Senate Bill 1437 in the Senate
Judiciary Committee. 16 As originally introduced, the bill created a sentencing
commission that would be charged with promulgating sentencing guidelines to
guide the discretion of federal district court judges.' It did not, however, make
9. See Stith & Koh, supra note 6, at 263-64.
10. Id. at 261.
11. Id. at 258-61.
12. See United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) ("[The broad discretion afforded to federal judges
prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act] led to perceptions that 'federal judges mete out an
unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed
under similar circumstances."') (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983)); KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES,
FEAR OF JUDGING 104 (1998); Stith & Koh, supra note 6, at 230-31.
13. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973).
14. Id.; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 35-36. To illustrate the problem of indeterminate
sentencing, Judge Frankel recounted a story about a "casual anecdote" over cocktails among judges:
Judge X . . . told of a defendant for whom the judge, after reading the presentence report, had
decided tentatively upon a sentence of four years' imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing...
Judge X invited the defendant to exercise his right to address the court in his own behalf. The
defendant... excoriate[ed] the judge, the "kangaroo court" in which he'd been tried, and the legal
establishment in general. Completing the story, Judge X said, "I listened without interrupting.
Finally, when he said he was through, I simply gave the son of a bitch five years instead of the four."
FRANKEL, supra at 18. Judge Frankel went on to criticize a system in which the defendant not only would be
given additional punishment for criticizing the court, but also was "never told.. .how the fifth year of his term
came to be added." Id. at 18-19.
15. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 38.
16. See Stith & Koh, supra note 6, at 233.
17. S. 1437,95th Cong. (1977).
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those guidelines binding or mandatory.' 8 In 1978, the bill reached the floor of the
Senate where Senator Gary Hart of Colorado introduced an amendment which,
for the first time, required judges to impose sentences within the applicable
Guidelines range.'9 The amended bill, after only the briefest of debate, passed the
Senate by a vote of seventy-two to fifteen. 0 Although Senate Bill 1437 died after
the House of Representatives refused to take action, Senate Bill 1762, which
ultimately became the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, retained many of the
features of Senate Bill 1437, including the creation of a sentencing commission
to promulgate sentencing guidelines and the language from Senator Hart's
amendment that made the Guidelines mandatory.2'
By the time Senate Bill 1762 was debated in the Senate Judiciary Committee
and ultimately presented to the Senate, however, the political dynamics of the
Senate had changed. Most notably, the Republicans had assumed control of the
Senate in 1981, and Senator Strom Thurmond had become chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee.22 In addition to Senator Kennedy's concerns about
disparity in sentencing, conservative senators believed that federal judges were
using their discretion to be overly-lenient in sentencing.2 For those senators, the
value of mandatory guidelines apparently was obvious and beyond debate.
Indeed, the only debate in the Senate regarding whether the Guidelines should be
mandatory or advisory arose after Senator Mathias introduced an amendment to
give federal judges more discretion to depart from the Guidelines.24 The
Committee quickly rejected that proposal, concluding that voluntary guidelines
would not promote sentencing uniformity because judges would not follow
18. See Miller & Wright, supra note 6, at 736-37 (noting that, as introduced, "Senate Bill 1437 said only
that the judge should consider a range of factors" including, the guideline sentence, but noting that the judge
would have to state his reasons for his sentence, including the reasons for any departure from the guidelines).
19. See 124 CONG. REc. 371, 382-83 (1978) ("[T]he court shall impose a sentence within the range [of
the sentencing Guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance that
was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission .. "). That language from Senate
Bill 1437 survived through to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Stith & Koh, supra note 6, at 245-46; Miller
& Wright, supra note 6, at 736. Prior to the passage of that amendment, the bill required only that judges
consider the guidelines promulgated by the Commission. 124 CONG. REc. 371, 383 (1978).
20. The debate over the provision that made the Guidelines binding upon judges was debated on the
floor of the Senate for less than a page of the Congressional Record. 124 CONG. REc. 371, 382-83 (1978).
Senator Kennedy supported the amendment, saying that what the amendment did was "make clearer the basic
presumptive aspects of the guidelines." Id.
21. S. 1762, 98th Cong. (1983).
22. Stith & Koh, supra note 6, at 258.
23. Id. at 261-62 ("'[I am] disturbed by the point of view that each offense and offender should
necessarily be approached from the lenient perspective ... [I prefer] guidelines and policy statements that have
teeth in them."') (quoting Senator Thurmond explaining his support for the bill); STITH & CABRANES, supra
note 12, at 43 ("[The Sentencing Reform Act] was consistent with the 'get tough' approach of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of which it was a part.").
24. See Miller & Wright, supra note 6, at 738-40 (detailing the debate about the Mathias amendment in
the Senate Judiciary Committee).
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them.25 Thus, in 1978, the convergence of interests of liberal senators concerned
about sentencing disparity and conservative senators concerned about overly-
lenient judges resulted in the passage, by a vote of ninety-one to one, of the
Sentencing Reform Act as a part of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1984.26
While the idea of binding guidelines appeared relatively non-controversial to
the Senate, the House of Representatives felt differently. When Senate Bill 1762
reached the House, the House Judiciary Committee refused to act on it, at least in
part because of the mandatory nature of the proposed guidelines scheme.
2 1
Instead, the House Judiciary Committee passed House Resolution 6012, which
would have led to the promulgation of advisory sentencing guidelines.2 s
Representing a compromise about which no member of the House was
particularly enthusiastic, House Resolution 6012 never came before the full
House for a vote29 and it appeared that sentencing reform had been stalled as it
was in 1978. Finally, Senate Bill 1762 was attached to an appropriations bill that
had to be considered by the House because of a looming government shut-
down. 30 Because of parliamentary procedure, the entire appropriations act had to
be considered without amendment.' Ultimately, by virtue of this maneuver, the
Sentencing Reform Act was passed by the House and the President signed the
Act into law on October 12, 1984.32
Three years later, pursuant to the directive in the Sentencing Reform Act, the
Commission promulgated the Guidelines, which took effect on November 1,
1987. 3" The Guidelines set narrow sentencing ranges that were determined by
applying a grid to a complex set of factors. Most significantly, pursuant to the
direction of the Sentencing Reform Act, judges were not permitted to sentence
outside of the Guidelines' range absent extraordinary circumstances. 34
25. See id. In explaining its rejection of Senator Mathias' proposed amendment, the Judiciary
Committee pointed to the failure of advisory guidelines in Massachusetts. S. REP. No. 98-1762, at 79 (1983).
26. See Stith & Koh, supra note 6, at 261. Senator Mathias, a liberal senator who had tried to make the
guidelines voluntary rather than binding, cast the only dissenting vote. Id. at 260-61.
27. Id. at 262-63. Representative Conyers, the Chair of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, was
adamantly opposed to mandatory sentencing guidelines "because he believed that justice required 'leaving
judges free to tailor sentences to the unique circumstances involved in each case."' STITH & CABRANES, supra
note 12, at 46-48.
28. See Stith & Koh, supra note 6, at 262 (noting that H.R. 6012 provided for both "advisory" and
judicial guidelines); Miller & Wright, supra note 6, at 742-43 (describing the guidelines called for in H.R. 6012
as somewhere between voluntary and binding).
29. H.R. 6012, 98th Cong. (1983).
30. Miller & Wright, supra note 6, at 744-45; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 47-48.
31. Stith & Koh, supra note 6, at 264-65.
32. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 47-48.
33. Id. at 58.
34. Because the Sentencing Reform Act provided that a judge could depart from the Guidelines only if
he or she found that "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that" prescribed by the Guidelines, judges retained limited discretion to
"depart" from the Guidelines in certain extraordinary cases. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West 1995); see
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Even with sentencing guidelines firmly in place and clearly binding upon
judges, members of Congress apparently still believed that district court judges
were exercising too much discretion in sentencing." In contrast to the debates of
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the criticism of federal court sentencing in the
1990s focused solely on the perceived excessive leniency of federal judges and
not on the concern that sentences might be disparate.36 That criticism culminated
in 2003, when, citing the lawlessness of federal judges, Congress struck out
against what it still perceived as excessive discretion in the hands of federal
judges; most notably, Congress questioned the discretion to depart from the
applicable Guidelines range in extraordinary cases.37 This modicum of discretion,
although not used particularly frequently by judges, had become a source of great
consternation to Congress, and so it limited that discretion by passing the
PROTECT Act.38 As the bill's sponsor put it, amending the Guidelines would
correct the "serious problem of downward departures from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines by judges across the country."3 9 Although passed as part
of a bill aimed at enhancing penalties for offenders in child sexual abuse cases,
the amendments to the Guidelines more broadly restricted district court judges in
all types of cases by (1) prohibiting judges from adjusting sentences downward
for acceptance of responsibility (i.e., a guilty plea), except upon a government
motion; (2) requiring written statements of reasons for any grant of a downward
departure; and (3) providing a de novo standard of review for all departures. a°
Thus, by 2005, the Sentencing Reform Act and the amendments in the
PROTECT Act had combined to strip federal judges of virtually all discretion in
sentencing decisions.
also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1993). That discretion, however, was fairly circumscribed both by the
Guidelines themselves and by review of the appellate courts.
35. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
36. Id.
37. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667 (2003) (directing the Commission
to amend the Guidelines).
38. Id. In the overwhelming majority of cases, judges did not grant downward departures unless
requested by the government. For instance, in fiscal year 2002, sentences within the Guidelines range were
imposed in sixty-five percent of cases. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING
PROJECT 7 (Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_010506.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). In half of the cases involving departures, however, the government moved for the
departure because the defendant had provided substantial assistance to the government in the prosecution of
another. Id. In only 16.8% of the total cases did the district court judge, without a government request, depart
downward pursuant to the authority granted in United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
39. 149 CONG. REC. H3061 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Representative Tom Feeney).
40. See Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U.
L. REV. 693, 718-19 (2005). In order to further limit the authority of the judiciary in sentencing matters, the Act
altered the composition of the Sentencing Commission. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat.
650, 667 (2003). Although the Sentencing Reform Act previously required that at least three members of the
Commission be active judges, the PROTECT Act amended the composition to provide that judges can
constitute no more than three members. Id.
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In 2005, sentencing discretion was restored to federal judges. In United
States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines scheme was unconstitutional because defendants' sentences were
enhanced based on factual findings made by judges, rather than juries.4 ' The
remedy, according to a different majority of the Court, was to excise that portion
of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the Guidelines mandatory and make
them discretionary. 2 Thus, under the Court's remedy, federal district court judges
now have only to consider the Guidelines, along with other factors, to arrive at a
sentence, but they are not required to impose a sentence within the applicable
Guidelines range. 3 Moreover, although the courts of appeals retain some
authority to review sentences, that role is not as significant as it was pre-Booker.
4
4
III. ARE MANDATORY GUIDELINES NECESSARY?
In light of the Court's conclusion that the current guidelines scheme is
unconstitutional if mandatory, Congress is back where it was in 1984, facing a
decision whether to retain the voluntary guidelines now in place or try to adopt a
mandatory scheme that would achieve the same effect as the pre-Booker
Guidelines.45 If mandatory guidelines were necessary to address the concerns
41. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243-44. Until 2000, when the Court decided Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), virtually nobody could have anticipated the decision in Booker. The cases leading
up to the Court's decision in Booker and the unlikely coalition that formed the majority in those cases make for
fascinating history and have been explored and debated in numerous articles. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ethan
A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58
STAN. L. REV. 195 (2005).
42. Booker, 543 U.S. 245-46. The majority opinion of the Court finding the Guidelines unconstitutional
was authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Souter, and Ginsburg. The other four
dissented from the conclusion that the Guidelines were unconstitutional. Four of the five Justices who had
joined the majority opinion (all except Justice Ginsburg) concluded that the appropriate remedy was to maintain
the Guidelines structure and the mandatory nature of that structure, but require that the government prove any
enhancement factors to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than to a judge by a preponderance of the
evidence. For reasons that are not entirely clear, Justice Ginsburg joined the merits dissenters to form a different
majority on the remedy. See Klein, supra note 40, at 716-17 (speculating that the reason Justice Ginsburg
switched sides on the remedy was due either to her friendship with Justice Breyer, the author of the majority
opinion on remedy, or to her desire to see a return to judicial discretion in sentencing).
43. Booker, 543 U.S. 245-46. The other sentencing factors that a sentencing judge "shall" consider
include "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," "the
need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence ... [and] protect the public, . . . [and] the need to avoid
unwarranted sentenc[ing] disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(1), (2), (6) (West 2000).
44. Booker, 543 U.S. 260-61.
45. Although the Supreme Court held that the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines as
promulgated rendered the scheme unconstitutional, there still are mandatory guidelines schemes that might be
deemed constitutional. For instance, it appears that if Congress adjusted the top end of the guideline range (or
the maximum) to the statutory maximum penalty for the offense, and altered only the bottom end of the range
(the minimum sentence to be imposed) based upon findings by the judge, such a scheme would not implicate the
Court's ruling in Booker. This is because the antecedents to Booker, both Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
304-05 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491-97 (2000), held that findings as to facts that
increase the maximum presumptive penalty are required to be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a
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expressed in 1984, then perhaps it would make sense to consider enacting a
mandatory guidelines scheme rather than retaining the advisory guidelines that
already have been ruled constitutional.46 In fact, however, all of the evidence
points to the conclusion that mandatory guidelines were not necessary in 1984
and certainly are not necessary in federal court today.
Sentencing reformers in the 1970s and 1980s dismissed advisory guidelines
too quickly. The dual concerns that motivated the passage of the Sentencing
Reform Act-sentence disparity and excessive leniency-could have resulted either
from intentional decisions by judges to impose sentences that were both disparate
and excessively lenient, or from a lack of information and guidance from
Congress. 7 If those problems were the result of the former, then mandatory
guidelines were necessary. If the problems were a result of the latter, however,
advisory guidelines would solve the problem equally as well as mandatory
guidelines. Although advisory guidelines were quickly dismissed during
Congressional debates, there really was no evidence that either of these perceived
problems resulted from intentional decisions by federal district court judges to
impose divergent or overly-lenient sentences. Instead, to the extent that
"divergent" sentences were imposed, it is just as likely that those divergences
resulted from a lack of information as from a deliberate attempt to impose
arbitrary sentences.
Imagine a judge in 1983, prior to the passage of the Guidelines, faced with
sentencing a defendant who has been convicted at trial of three counts of robbing
federally insured banks in the District of Maryland, but who has no prior criminal
history. The statute of conviction provides that a defendant convicted of such an
offense "[s]hall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
reasonable doubt, but both cases specifically distinguished findings of fact that increase the mandatory
minimum penalty.
46. Despite the fact that a binding guidelines scheme might be constitutional if it altered only the
minimum presumptive sentence, such a system certainly would be subject to extensive constitutional litigation
and uncertainty. The advisory guidelines scheme, by contrast, already has been found constitutional. Booker,
543 U.S. at 260-61.
47. For the purpose of analyzing the advisory guidelines' ability to respond to the concerns Congress
expressed in 1984, this article assumes that its identification of the problems was accurate. In other words, this
article assumes that there was sentencing disparity in federal courts and that judges were being excessively
lenient. Both of these propositions, however, are subject to dispute. For starters, the differing sentences of two
defendants are only impermissibly divergent or disparate if the two defendants are similarly situated. That
assessment, however, masks normative assumptions regarding the degree and type of similarity necessary to
deem two defendants similarly situated. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and
Empirical Failure of the Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2005). Thus, merely knowing that two defendants
have received different sentences tells us nothing about whether those sentences are impermissibly "disparate."
In addition, much of the empirical evidence that was used to support the argument that there were
egregious sentencing disparities in federal court has proven flawed. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 106-
07. And while Senators pointed to a few instances in which a district judge imposed a sentence that the Senators
deemed too lenient, there were no empirical studies at the time to either catalog sentences imposed or explain
the reasons for those sentences. Absent that data, it is difficult to ascertain whether in fact sentences were
lenient or not.
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twenty years, or both., 8 Because the defendant was convicted of three counts,
there would be three potential twenty-year terms and the district judge therefore
would have the option of giving the defendant a sentence of probation (at the
extreme low end) or up to sixty years imprisonment (at the high end).
Then imagine that the judge decides she wants to give the defendant a
rational sentence, consistent with the sentence a similarly-situated defendant
would receive from other judges across the nation. In determining the sentence,
she turns first to any guidance provided by Congress. Unfortunately, the only
guidance provided by Congress is that there is "[n]o limitation... on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purposes of imposing an appropriate sentence. 4 9 No further
guidance regarding the type of sentence, or the factors the judge should consider,
is provided anywhere in the federal criminal code. Lacking any more specific
direction from Congress, perhaps she decides upon other factors that, in her view,
make this defendant similarly situated to other defendants, so as to sentence this
defendant consistently. She takes note of the fact that the defendant used a gun in
holding up the banks, received $40,000 from his heists, and acted alone. On the
mitigating side, she acknowledges that he had held a steady job for twenty years,
but had been laid off and that it was only after he was evicted from his apartment
and sued for failure to pay child support that he robbed the banks. Now that she
has determined the appropriate factors to consider, where does she turn for
information regarding what other judges nationwide would do in a similar case
with a similar defendant?
The simple answer is that in 1984 such information was not available. At
most, and only with a significant amount of effort, she might have been able to
gather nationwide statistics on sentences for defendants convicted of violating the
bank robbery statute. But how should she weigh the aggravating and mitigating
factors?
Perhaps she turns to her colleagues in her district and asks them how they
have sentenced bank robbers. Certainly some of them will have sentenced
defendants convicted of bank robbery, but given her small pool of data, she can
find no sentence for a defendant who, in her view, was similarly situated. Our
judge is then left to follow the general advice given to her by other judges and
rely on her intuition regarding the appropriate sentence. And if she decides that
forty years imprisonment is the appropriate sentence, should she be blamed when
a district court judge in Hawaii sentenced what our judge would have thought to
be a similarly-situated defendant to three years imprisonment? I think not. In
other words, to the extent that pre-Guidelines sentences in federal court were
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1988) (as enacted in 1982).
49. 18 U.S.C. §. 3577 (1982) amended by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000)).
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different from judge to judge, it may well have been the result of a lack of
information, rather than lawless behavior by judges.
Similarly, with respect to the concern that federal judges pre-Guidelines were
using their discretion to sentence too leniently, it is not at all clear that pre-
Guidelines judges were intentionally trying to flout the will of Congress in
imposing such sentences. Instead, Congress simply had failed to provide district
court judges with any guidance as to what would constitute an appropriately
severe sentence. -50 Indeed, Congress failed even to articulate a philosophy to
guide sentencing judges in exercising their discretion, let alone to specify factors
that Congress wanted judges to consider in sentencing.' Left to their own
devices, without any guidance, district judges fashioned sentences that they
believed appropriate.52 Given that state of affairs, it is difficult to understand how
a district court judge pre-Guidelines was supposed to have determined, and
sentenced within, the will of Congress other than by sentencing within the broad
statutory ranges set by Congress.
Thus, it appears that mandatory guidelines were not necessary to solve the
problems identified by Congress in 1984. Now, twenty years later, the case for
mandatory guidelines is even weaker. First, the informational problems that
arguably led to disparate or overly-lenient sentences no longer exist, or at least
not to the same extent. Data regarding sentencing for a myriad of offenders and
offense characteristics now are available, in large part because one of the primary
functions of the Sentencing Commission has been to collect and disseminate such
data.53 Thus, the advisory guidelines and the additional data published by the
Sentencing Commission provide federal judges today with a baseline that they
50. Id. As discussed above, Congress provided absolutely no guidance to district court judges regarding
what an appropriately severe sentence would be. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
51. See FRANKEL, supra note 13, at 7 ("Our Congress and state legislatures have failed even to study and
resolve the most basic of the questions affecting criminal penalties, the questions of justification and
purpose... I make the point that our legislators have not done the most rudimentary job of enacting meaningful
sentencing 'laws' when they have neglected even to sketch democratically determined statements of basic
purpose.").
52. Even Judge Frankel, who sharply criticized the lawlessness of federal sentencing, recognized that
much of the problem was due to lack of guidance from Congress. See id. ("Broad statutory ranges might
approach a degree of ordered rationality if there were prescribed any standards for locating a particular case
within any range. But neither our federal law nor that of any other state I know contains meaningful criteria for
this purpose.").
53. 28 U.S.C.A. § 995(a)(l 2)-(16) (West 1996). Although the information-gathering functions are
contained within § 995 ("Powers of the Commission") and not in § 994's "Duties of the Commission," the
Sentencing Commission certainly appears to view the collection and dissemination of data as one of its primary
purposes. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION (June 2005),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(listing among the three primary purposes of the Commission "to collect, analyze, research, and distribute a
broad array of information on federal crime and sentencing issues, serving as an information resource for
Congress, the executive branch, the courts, criminal justice practitioners, the academic community, and the
public"). In addition, the Commission publishes significant statistical information about sentencing in federal
courts. Id.
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can use to ensure that their own sentences do not vary drastically from those of
other judges.54
Second, there is empirical evidence to suggest that advisory guidelines are
just as effective as mandatory guidelines in controlling disparity and in ensuring
that the severity of sentences is consistent with the expressed will of Congress.55
In the year following the Court's decision in Booker, the rate of sentencing
within the Guidelines range was only slightly lower than in the years when the
Guidelines were mandatory.56 If within-range cases and government-sponsored
below-range cases are combined,57 district court judges post-Booker complied
with the Guidelines in 85.9% of the cases.58 This compliance rate is only slightly
below the pre-PROTECT Act compliance rate of 90.6%, and the post-PROTECT
Act compliance rate of 93.7%.59
The evidence also suggests that district court judges are not being excessively
lenient with their newfound discretion. Contrary to the prevalent view in Congress
that sentencing judges would be inclined to be more lenient if given additional
discretion, the average sentence length post-Booker has increased.6 In addition, the
post-Booker rate of upward departures is approximately double the pre-Booker rate
61
of upward departures. Moreover, to the extent that the concern motivating Congress
to consider mandatory guidelines is excessive leniency, the vast majority of cases in
which sentences are imposed below the Guidelines range are the result of
government motions. In the eleven months after Booker was decided, downward
54. See Marc Miller & Ronald Wright, "The Wisdom We Have Lost": Sentencing Information and Its
Uses, 58 STANFORD L. REV. 361, 370-72 (2005) (arguing that the Sentencing Commission should collect data in
part for the use of judges).
55. There is significant debate regarding whether the mandatory Guidelines in fact controlled disparity
in sentencing. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 47 (arguing that the Guidelines increased disparity in sentencing).
While I agree that the Guidelines may not have eliminated disparity, my only point here is that advisory
guidelines appear to control disparity as effectively as mandatory guidelines.
56. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON
FEDERAL SENTENCING 46 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker-report/BookerReport.pdf
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
57. The category of government-sponsored below-range sentences includes cases in which the
government (1) moved for a downward departure based upon the defendant's substantial assistance to the
government pursuant to section 5Kl.1 of the Guidelines, (2) moved for a downard departure based upon the
defendant's early plea in so-called fast-track cases pursuant to section 5K3.1, or (3) otherwise agreed to a
sentence outside of the Guidelines range. See id. at 53. These government-sponsored departures are included as
part of the Guidelines "compliance" rate because the Guidelines specifically authorize prosecutors to seek these
departures, and because a motion by the government is required before the sentence deviated from the
applicable Guidelines range.
58. Id. at 57.
59. Id. The pre-PROTECT Act period covers cases decided between October 1. 2002 (the beginning of
the government's fiscal year) and April 30, 2003 (the date of enactment of the PROTECT Act). Id. at 45. The
Post-PROTECT Act period covers cases decided between May 1, 2003 (when the PROTECT Act went into
effect) and June 24, 2004 (when the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the
pre-curser to Booker). Id.
60. Id. at 46, 75.
61. Id. at 58. Post-Booker sentences exceeded the applicable Guidelines range in 1.6% of all cases. Id.
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departures for substantial assistance to the government were granted in
approximately fifteen percent of the cases sentenced in federal court.62 Although
sentences below the Guidelines range, other than for substantial assistance to the
government, were imposed in another twenty-two percent of the cases post-Booker,
forty-three percent of those below-range sentences were as a result of requests by the
government.63 In other words, to the extent that defendants in federal court are being
sentenced leniently, it is due not to the excessive leniency of federal judges but
instead to the determination by prosecutors that sentences within the Guidelines
ranges are not appropriate in certain cases.64 And, given that the Guidelines
specifically provide prosecuting authorities with the discretion to make those
decisions, and that Congress has endorsed those departures, federal judges can hardly
be faulted for granting the government's motions.65
To be fair, Congress's skepticism regarding the potential abuse of sentencing
discretion by federal judges stems, at least in part, from the reaction of judges to the
Guidelines.66 Much of the reaction of the judiciary, however, was to the mandatory
nature of the Guidelines, rather than to the concept of guided discretion. Given the
opportunity to use advisory guidelines post-Booker, it is clear that judges understand
the importance of exercising their discretion carefully and staying within Guidelines
ranges absent extraordinary circumstances.6
62. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT, supra note 38, at 1. Section
5K1.1 of the Guidelines permits a judge to depart downward upon motion of the government in a case in which
the defendant has offered substantial assistance to the government in the arrest or prosecution of another. Id. at
7. Prior to Booker, a district judge was not permitted to depart pursuant to section 5K1.1, absent a government
motion. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case No. 97-3112, 181 F.3d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that a government
motion is required for a departure pursuant to section 5K 1.1).
63. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT, supra note 38, at 7. Outside of
substantial assistance cases, the primary category of departures initiated by the government is in so-called fast-
track cases. In the PROTECT Act, Congress amended the Guidelines to provide for a downward departure upon
motion of the government in cases in which defendants waive procedural rights. See id. at 7.
64. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 47, at 112-15 (noting that even during the period when the
Guidelines were mandatory, government-sponsored departures were prevalent).
65. In particular, Congress's endorsement of another government-sponsored downward departure in the
PROTECT Act indicated that it was willing to endorse downward departures sought by the government.
PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667 (2003); Alschuler, supra note 47, at 113-16.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Hively, 61 F.3d 1358, 1365 (8th Cir. 1995) (Bright, J. concurring) (citing
to a 1992 Federal Judicial Center study that found 86.4% of all federal district court judges "support[ed]
changing the current sentencing rules to increase discretion of the judge" and "[m]ore than half would eliminate
sentencing guidelines"); United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 963-71 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Guidelines are flawed and need reform and listing in the appendix nearly twenty
judicial opinions critical of the Guidelines); Laurie P. Cohen, Ashcroft Intensifies Campaign Against Soft
Sentences by Judges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A (noting that the judiciary's "criticism of the Justice
Department and the Congress has been at a fever pitch since President Bush signed the Feeney Amendment [to
the PROTECT Act] into law"); Joseph B. Treaster, 2 Judges Decline Drug Cases, Protesting Sentencing Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993 (reporting that Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York and
Judge Whitman Knapp of the Southern District of New York, would no longer preside over drug cases "in
protest against national drug policies and Federal sentencing guidelines").
67. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 931-32 (D. Utah 2005) (concluding
post-Booker, that it would "generally hew to the Guidelines in imposing criminal punishments" and noting that
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Finally, advisory guidelines, in addition to being constitutional, appear to
further the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act. In particular, it appears that
sentencing will be more transparent with the advent of the advisory guidelines.
Although the rate of sentencing within the Guidelines range post-Booker has
remained relatively consistent with the rate pre-Booker, the method of departure
has altered somewhat. In fiscal years 2001-2002, downward departures, other
than those sponsored by the government, were granted in seventeen to eighteen
percent of the cases sentenced in federal court. 68 Post-Booker, downward
departures pursuant to the Guidelines, other than those sponsored by the
government, were granted in only 3.2% of the cases, while defendants sentenced
below the Guidelines range pursuant to the authority granted to judges in Booker
occurred in 6.3% of the cases.6 9 It appears that in cases sentenced below the
Guidelines range, federal judges now are being more honest about their reasons
for departing. 70 Allowing judges to articulate their true reasons for sentencing
outside of the Guidelines range, rather than requiring them to attempt to fit all
cases within the rigid structure of the Guidelines, will allow better, and more
forthright review of the factors that ultimately lead district court judges to depart.
IV. CONCLUSION
An advisory guidelines system addresses the two concerns that initially led to
the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984--disparity and excessive
leniency-at least as well, and probably better than, mandatory guidelines. With
hindsight, it appears that mandatory guidelines may not have been necessary in
the first place, and certainly now, with twenty years of Guidelines experience,
there is strong evidence that district judges will adhere to advisory guidelines just
as they did to mandatory guidelines. Booker gave federal judges the opportunity
to prove to Congress that they would follow advisory guidelines and that
mandatory guidelines are not necessary. Congress should take the opportunity
offered by Booker to recognize the value and appropriateness of advisory
guidelines.
the "congressional view" on how to structure a post-Booker sentencing scheme "will surely be informed by how
judges respond to their newly-granted freedom under the 'advisory' Guidelines system"). "If that discretion is
abused by sentences that thwart congressional objectives, Congress has ample power to respond with mandatory
minimum sentences and the like." Id.
68. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT, supra note 38, at 7.
69. Id. at 1.
70. District courts under the new system still are required to articulate their reasons for the sentence
imposed. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c)(2) (West 2000) (requiring district judges to "state in open court the reasons for
its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence.., is outside the range [set forth in the
Guidelines], the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that described"); United States v.
Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426-27 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court must articulate its reasons for
departing from applicable guidelines range); United States v. Menyweather, 431 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2005).
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